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The Post-2015 Agenda with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as one of 
its key components is intended to be truly universal and global. This requires a fair 
sharing of costs, responsibilities and opportunities among and within countries. The 
principle of »common but differentiated responsibilities« (CBDR) must be applied. 
Coupled with the human rights principle of equal rights for all and the need to re-
spect the planetary boundaries, this necessarily translates into different obligations 
for different categories of countries – as well as individuals within these countries.
The rich and powerful have special responsibilities. For them we can broadly distin-
guish three types of goals and targets: those that are of particular relevance to the 
internal affairs of all including rich countries, requiring changes in their domestic 
policies (»domestic sustainability targets«); those that address the need to change 
domestic policies in order to reduce negative external effects beyond a country’s 
borders (»do-no-harm targets«); and those that zero in on their international duties 
and responsibilities (»international responsibility targets«).
Three specific »goals for the rich« are particularly important for sustainable devel-
opment worldwide. In the list of 17 SDGs proposed by the Open Working Group of 
the UN General Assembly these are: The goal to reduce inequality within and among 
countries (goal 10), the goal to ensure sustainable consumption and production pat-
terns (goal 12), and the goal to strengthen the means of implementation and revital-
ize the global partnership for development (goal 17). The Post-2015 Agenda will only 
succeed if these goals include specific and time-bound targets and commitments for 
the rich that trigger the necessary regulatory and fiscal policy changes.
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1. Introduction: Context and Principles
After many years of focusing on the symptoms of ex-
treme poverty with the pursuit of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs), the UN system is finally picking 
up a universal sustainability agenda, enshrined in the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), that address 
sustainability and causes of poverty and inequality.
The Open Working Group of the UN General Assembly 
on Sustainable Development Goals has proposed a list 
of 17 goals and 169 targets.1 The consensus outcome 
of this group, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 
September 2014 as the »main basis« of the post-2015 
development agenda, goes far beyond the narrow scope 
of the MDGs. 
The MDGs provided an international framework for the 
advancement of social development for the poor in the 
global South with a little help from the rich in the global 
North. Unlike the MDGs, the Post-2015 Agenda with the 
SDGs as a pivotal building block is intended to be truly 
universal and global. SDGs will be for everybody, rich 
countries, countries with emerging economies and poor 
countries. 
If it succeeds, this new global sustainability agenda 
would not only take forward the unfinished business 
of the MDGs, by ending poverty in all its forms every-
where, but add important dimensions. Apart from the 
potential to tackle inequalities and injustices worldwide, 
it would trigger decisive action to protect the integrity of 
our planet, to combat climate change, and put an end 
to the overuse of resources and ecosystems by acknowl-
edging planetary boundaries and promoting the respect 
for nature. 
In his Synthesis Report on the Post-2015 Agenda ti-
tled »The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, 
Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet« the 
UN-Secretary General makes »a universal call to action 
to transform our world beyond 2015«. Such a global 
transformation, however, would require not only the 
mobilization of the international community but also a 
fair sharing of costs, responsibilities and opportunities 
among and within countries.
1. Cf. UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals 
(2014).
In the Rio Declaration and in climate negotiations, coun-
tries have agreed to the principle of »common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities« (CBDR). They are common 
because we all share one atmosphere and human ac-
tivities everywhere contribute to the accumulation of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. They are 
differentiated because, for example, emissions are dra-
matically different from country to country (from 18,000 
to 200 kilos per capita per year in the US and Timor Leste 
respectively2) and also because of historical responsibili-
ties, highly relevant because CO2 stays in the atmosphere 
for centuries. The CBDR principle must also be applied 
to the broader Post-2015 Agenda. Coupled with the hu-
man rights principle of equal rights for all, this necessari-
ly translates into different levels of ambition for different 
categories of countries – as well as different categories 
of individuals within these countries – when it comes to 
certain goals and targets that must be met, for instance, 
to respect planetary boundaries or reduce inequalities 
within and among countries.
2. The Rich and Powerful  
Have Special Responsibilities
2.1. ›Goals for the Rich‹ – a Typology 
All of the 17 goals proposed by the Open Working Group 
are relevant for rich, poor and emerging economies, in 
North and South alike. All governments that subscribe to 
the Post-2015 Agenda must deliver on all goals. On the 
face of it, for rich countries, many of the goals and tar-
gets seem to be quite easy to fulfill or have already been 
achieved, especially those related to social accomplish-
ments (e.g. targets related to absolute poverty, primary 
education or primary health care). Unfortunately, social 
achievements in reality are often fragile particularly for 
the socially excluded and can easily be rolled back as a 
result of conflict (as in the case of Ukraine), of capital-
ism in crisis (in many countries after 2008) or as a result 
of wrong-headed, economically foolish and socially de-
structive policies, as in the case of austerity policies in 
many regions, from Latin America to Asia to Southern 
Europe. In the name of debt reduction and improved 
competitiveness, these policies brought about large-
scale unemployment and widespread impoverishment, 
2. World Bank data available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
EN.ATM.CO2E.PC.
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often coupled with the loss of basic income support or 
access to basic primary health care. More often than not, 
this perversely increased sovereign debt instead of de-
creasing it (»Paradox of thrift«).
But also under ›normal‹ circumstances some of the 
»MDG-plus« targets relating to poverty eradication and 
other social development issues may prove to be a real 
challenge in many parts of the rich world, where poverty 
has been rising. In the United States poverty increased 
steadily in the last two decades and currently affects 
some 50 million people, measured by the official thresh-
old of 23,850 US-Dollar a year for a family of four. In 
Germany, 20.3 per cent of the population – a total of 
16.2 million people – were affected by poverty or social 
exclusion in 2013.3 In the European Union as a whole, 
the proportion of poor or socially excluded people was 
24.5 per cent. To address this and similar situations, tar-
get 1.2 in the Open Working Group’s proposal requests 
countries to »by 2030, reduce at least by half the pro-
portion of men, women and children of all ages living in 
poverty in all its dimensions according to national defi-
nitions«. 
How one looks at ›goals for the rich‹ depends on wheth-
er one takes a narrow national or inward-looking view, 
or whether one takes into account the international re-
sponsibilities and extraterritorial obligations of countries 
for past, present and future actions and omissions af-
fecting others beyond a country’s borders; whether one 
accepts and honors the CBDR principle for the future of 
humankind and planet earth. In addition, this depends 
on whether one accepts home country responsibilities 
for actions and omissions of non-state actors, such as 
transnational corporations and their international sup-
ply chains. Contemporary international soft law (e.g. 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights) is 
based on this assumption, as are other accords such as 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
Last, but not least, rich countries tend to be more pow-
erful in terms of their influence on international and 
global policymaking and standard setting. Actions by 
international institutions like the IMF or World Bank are 
shaped by their governing bodies, whose composition 
is directly linked to the affluence of member countries. 
3.  Cf. https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/12/
PE14_454_634.html. 
Similar patterns exist in donor-recipient relationships or 
in the dynamics of international and / or inter-state nego-
tiations. The results can be very tangible, as in the case 
of the creditor-debtor-relationship between Greece and 
EU and IMF, or rather subtle as sometimes in the voting 
behavior of smaller actors in the UN Security Council. 
How do we apply these realities and obligations to the 
goals and targets for sustainable development? How do 
we differentiate responsibilities to be sure of a universal 
agenda that explicitly includes obligations and ›goals for 
the rich‹? To do this, we can broadly distinguish three 
types of goals and targets:
n Among the universally valid goals and targets there 
are some of particular relevance to the internal situation 
of all including rich countries, requiring changes in their 
domestic policies. Most notably are targets that derive 
from international human rights obligations, in particu-
lar with regard to economic, social and cultural rights. 
Examples from the Open Working Group’s proposal 
include ending all forms of discrimination and violence 
against women and girls, eliminating the gender pay gap 
or ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive 
health and reproductive rights (SDG 5); the reduction of 
the proportion of people living in poverty (target 1.2.), 
ensuring social protection for all (target 1.3); universal 
health coverage (SDG 3), full employment and decent 
work for all (target 8.5.), labour rights and a safe and 
secure working environment for all workers (target 8.8.), 
or the target to provide access to safe, affordable, acces-
sible and sustainable transport systems for all, notably 
by expanding public transport (target 11.2). These goals 
and targets requiring changes in domestic policies (for 
domestic reasons) are referred to here as »domestic 
sustainability targets«.
n A second type of goals and targets addresses the 
need to change domestic policy in order to reduce neg-
ative external effects beyond a country’s borders, be it in 
its immediate neighbourhood, or at regional and global 
levels. These goals and targets are referred to here as 
»do-no-harm-targets«. Examples could address poli-
cies to reduce a country’s ecological footprints and per 
capita greenhouse gas emissions. Monetary policy of re-
serve issuing countries / zones is another case of poten-
tial international damage created by domestic policies, 
as experienced over the last years with the »quantitative 
easing« policies and their »tapering« implemented by 
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the US Federal Reserve – and now also by the European 
Central Bank – that triggered destabilizing speculative 
capital flows to and from emerging economies. These 
and other types of ›beggar-thy-neighbour‹ policies could 
be addressed by target 17.13 that proposes to »enhance 
global macroeconomic stability« through »policy coordi-
nation and policy coherence« or target 10.5 to improve 
financial regulation. Tax policies that promote a race to 
the bottom and can deprive countries of revenue are 
partially addressed by target 17.1 that calls for »inter-
national support to developing countries to improve do-
mestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection«. 
The elimination of »all forms of agricultural export sub-
sidies«, as requested by target 2.b, illustrates where 
compliance by rich countries would reduce international 
harm caused by their domestic policies. (For more »do-
no-harm-targets« see box 1). However, a new target is 
needed to deal with harmful practices and human rights 
abuses by powerful non-state actors such as business 
enterprises and transnational corporations.4
n The third type of goals and targets ›for the rich‹ ze-
roes in on the international duties and responsibilities 
of a country. According to the principles of CBDR and 
the extraterritorial obligations of states derived from hu-
man rights principles,5 these »international responsi-
bility targets« are of particular relevance for affluent 
societies. Targets include classical official development 
assistance commitments, »including to provide 0.7 per 
cent of gross national income in official development 
assistance to developing countries« (target 17.2) as well 
as others – some yet to be created – that relate to the 
removal of structural obstacles and barriers to sustaina-
ble development. These action areas include fair trade 
and investment regimes and migration policies, and in-
ternational financial system reforms; more specifically 
they include the revision of bilateral and international 
investment agreements, the creation of a global regu-
latory framework for transnational corporations, greater 
flexibilities in intellectual property rights protection for 
developing countries, genuine efforts to combat tax 
evasion and profit shifting, the creation of a debt work-
out mechanism for highly indebted countries as well as 
4. This could for instance be a target with a reference to the ›Protect, Re-
spect and Remedy‹ framework of the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, e.g. asking for the existence of national action plans 
that, among other things, guarantee access to effective remedy, both 
judicial and non-judicial for victims of human rights abuses committed at 
home and abroad by companies that originate from that country.
5. Cf. www.etoconsortium.org/en/library/maastricht-principles/.
the reform of existing global economic governance insti-
tutions. All countries have responsibilities in this regard, 
but the rich have a greater responsibility given their ca-
pacity, resources and influence in international institu-
tions and economic governance.
Box 1: Do no harm – Examples of SDG 
targets aimed at changing domestic policies 
with negative external impacts
8.4 improve progressively through 2030 glob-
al resource efficiency in consumption and pro-
duction, and endeavour to decouple economic 
growth from environmental degradation (…) with 
developed countries taking the lead
8.8 protect labour rights and promote safe and 
secure working environments of all workers, in-
cluding migrant workers, particularly women mi-
grants, and those in precarious employment
10.7 facilitate orderly, safe, regular and respon-
sible migration and mobility of people, includ-
ing through implementation of planned and 
well-managed migration policies
12.2 by 2030 achieve sustainable management 
and efficient use of natural resources
12.3 by 2030 halve per capita global food waste 
at the retail and consumer level, and reduce food 
losses along production and supply chains includ-
ing post-harvest losses
12.4 by 2020 achieve environmentally sound man-
agement of chemicals and all wastes throughout 
their life cycle in accordance with agreed interna-
tional frameworks and significantly reduce their 
release to air, water and soil to minimize their 
adverse impacts on human health and the envi-
ronment
12.5 by 2030, substantially reduce waste genera-
tion through prevention, reduction, recycling, and 
reuse
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14.3 minimize and address the impacts of ocean 
acidification, including through enhanced scien-
tific cooperation at all levels
14.4 by 2020, effectively regulate harvesting, and 
end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing prac-
tices and implement science-based management 
plans, to restore fish stocks in the shortest time 
feasible at least to levels that can produce maxi-
mum sustainable yield as determined by their bio-
logical characteristics
14.6 by 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries 
subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contrib-
ute to IUU fishing, and refrain from introducing 
new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate 
and effective special and differential treatment 
for developing and least developed countries 
should be an integral part of the WTO fisheries 
subsidies negotiation*
15.6 ensure fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of genetic re-
sources, and promote appropriate access to ge-
netic resources
*Taking into account ongoing World Trade Organization negotiations, 
the Doha Development Agenda and the Hong Kong ministerial mandate.
Old promises, still unmet
While the Post-2015 Agenda and its goals and targets 
create important new international commitments for 
rich countries, existing commitments have to be met first 
for the new ones to be credible. These commitments 
include, inter alia, the 0.7 per cent commitment of 1970; 
the promise in 1984, when the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations started, that the two issues of particular 
interest for developing countries, agriculture and tex-
tiles, would be considered if they accepted a deal on 
services;6 the quota and governance reform of the IMF 
agreed to in 2010 by the G20 giving more voice and a 
6. The GATS was implemented in 1995, and TRIPS has created obstacles 
for access to medicines and knowledge, the »Development Round« at 
the WTO lingers on since 2001 without producing any tangible results.
greater share to emerging economies, being blocked by 
US Congress; or the promise from the Climate Summit 
in Copenhagen in 2009 to mobilize 100 billion dollars a 
year for climate adaptation and mitigation in developing 
countries »from a variety of sources« by 2020. With re-
gard to the latter, the deadline is approaching quickly, 
but commitments are waiting to be met. For example, 
only around 10 billion US-Dollar have been pledged for 
the Green Climate Fund by the end of 2014.7
All these commitments have been repeatedly promised 
by rich countries and were »repaid« by developing coun-
tries by making political and commercial concessions 
more suited to the interests, needs or demands of the 
powerful. That the rich countries did not live up to the 
expectations created feeds the reluctance of G77 coun-
tries to enter into new and additional international obli-
gations. Many of the SDG targets are merely a repetition 
of old unmet promises. Meeting these old commitments 
is an essential component for generating the goodwill 
and trust that will be needed to build an ambitious and 
transformative Post-2015 Agenda and achieve the SDGs.
Key goals for the rich
The above classification of ›domestic sustainability tar-
gets‹, ›do-no-harm targets‹ and ›global responsibility 
targets‹ emphasizes the need for explicit ›goals for the 
rich‹ in the Post-2015 Agenda. In practice, the distinc-
tion between those three categories is not clear-cut and 
partly artificial. In a globalized world there are only few 
areas where domestic policies can really act in isolation, 
without having any spill-overs across borders. In most 
cases, achieving an SDG requires fulfilling a combination 
of predominantly domestic, transnational as well as in-
ternational targets.
From a policy point of view, it seems useful to not only 
rely on those three categories but also look more closely 
at specific SDGs or groups of SDGs, which are crucial in 
defining a set of ›goals for the rich‹. To this end we put 
the spotlight on three specific »goals for the rich« that 
we consider as essential for sustainable development: The 
goal to reduce inequality within and among countries 
(goal 10), the goal to ensure sustainable consumption and 
7. Cf. www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_customer/documents/Press/re-
lease_GCF_2014_12_10_austria_pledge.pdf
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production patterns (goal 12), and the goal to strength-
en the means of implementation and revitalize the global 
partnership for development (goal 17).
2.2 Inequalities
Inequalities of income
The Open Working Group included in its list of SDGs the 
goal to reduce inequality within and among countries 
(goal 10). According to estimates, the world’s richest 
20 per cent earn about fifty times as much as the world’s 
poorest 20 per cent.8 Inequality in wealth is starker still: 
about half of global wealth is in the hands of the richest 
one per cent, while the other half is being shared by the 
remaining 99 per cent.9
Global inequality in income and wealth can be analyzed 
as the combined effect of inequality within and inequal-
ity between countries. For the past 200 years, global 
inequality can be attributed largely to a significant and 
continuous rise in income disparities between countries. 
According to recent estimates, the world income Gini 
coefficient has been increasing over the past 200 years 
from around 0.43 in the early 19th century to 0.71 in the 
first decade of the 21st century.10 While the income gap 
between countries seems to be gradually narrowing if 
recent trends persist, the gap between rich and poor in 
most countries of the world – rich and poor alike – has 
grown steadily and continues to grow, with the notable 
exception of some Latin American countries with proac-
tive social policies, like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador 
and Uruguay. Policies do make a difference.
There is no universally accepted norm of how much 
inequality within a society is deemed acceptable, fair 
or just.11 Also, what is acceptable varies between soci-
8. Cf. Dauderstädt/Keltek (2011).
9. Cf. Oxfam (2013) and Oxfam (2015).
10. Cf. Milanovic (2009). Only in the last few years has this trend seemed 
to have reversed due to the strong economic growth in countries like 
China.
11. There always have been attempts at defining how much inequality 
was acceptable in a given society at a given time. Greek philosopher 
Plato let’s one of his characters describe a just society as one in which 
the richest do not own more than four times as much as the poorest 
members of society (Cf. Krämer (2014). Recently in 2013, in Switzerland 
a referendum to introduce a legal pay ratio of 1:12 (i.e. no monthly salary 
in a company should be higher than the annual salary of the lowest paid) 
triggered an exceptionally high voter turn-out, but ultimately failed to 
get a majority.
eties and over time. However, with the agreement to 
include inequality on the list of SDGs, governments have 
acknowledged that inequality is a severe problem that 
requires political responses at the domestic and inter-
national levels. Indeed, inequality counts. UNDP calcu-
lates that in 2012, 23 percentage points in the Human 
Development Index were lost due to inequality.12 In 
2014, while average loss of human development due 
to inequality had declined in most regions, »disparities 
in income have risen in several regions.«13 According to 
the United Nations Department for Economic and Social 
Affairs, »the implications of rising inequality for social 
and economic development are many. There is growing 
evidence and recognition of the powerful and corrosive 
effects of inequality on economic growth, poverty re-
duction, social and economic stability and socially-sus-
tainable development.«14 Furthermore, inequality is an 
issue of social justice: »People want to live in societies 
that are fair, where hard work is rewarded, and where 
one’s socioeconomic position can be improved regard-
less of one’s background.«15 Inequality also matters 
more generally, to society at large. For rich countries 
there is evidence that residents in unequal societies are 
more likely to end up sick, obese, unhappy, or in jail.16 
Finally, economic inequality also endangers the political 
system when the political influence of the rich turns de-
mocracy into plutocracy.
However, as the only measurable target under this goal, 
the Open Working Group recommends: »by 2030 pro-
gressively achieve and sustain income growth of the 
bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher 
than the national average.«17 In this form, the target is 
inadequate. It provides neither a measure nor an explicit 
value for an improved income distribution and may lead 
to the wrong policy recommendations: 
12. UNDP (2013), pp. 13f.
13. UNDP (2014), p. 2.
14. Cf. UNDESA (2013), p. 21.
15. Ibid. p. 22.
16. British social epidemiologists Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have 
shown, that for middle- and high-income countries, more equal societies 
almost always do much better in almost every social area, ranging from 
health to crime, whereas absolute income levels don’t make a difference. 
Improving social well-being would require reducing differences in income 
and wealth rather than raising average income levels. Cf. Wilkinson / Pick-
ett (2009).
17. Cf. UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals 
(2014), Target 10.1.
7Civil SoCiety RefleCtion GRoup on Global Development peRSpeCtiveS  |  GoalS foR the RiCh
n In its current formulation (»by 2030 progressively 
achieve…«) the target allows for nothing to be done be-
tween now and 2030;
n it makes the reduction of inequality dependent on 
steady economic growth; 
n it refrains from referring to the need to redistribute 
income and wealth;
n and it does not mention any relationship between the 
incomes of the rich (particularly the »one per cent«) and 
those of the poor.
In further discussion about targets on inequality, govern-
ments should settle for a target that actually measures 
income distribution.
Unfortunately, the Gini-Coefficient, the most common 
distribution indicator, is not easy to communicate and 
has some methodological difficulties. A growing num-
ber of experts are proposing the use of the so-called 
»Palma ratio«18, i.e. the ratio of the income share of the 
top 10 per cent to that of the bottom 40 per cent of 
the population. Perfect income equality would result in a 
Palma ratio of 0.25, while perfect inequality would result 
in a ratio that strives towards infinity. The Palma ratio 
as an alternative measure of income concentration and 
inequality has the advantage of looking at both sides 
of the coin: at poverty on the one side and wealth on 
the other. This could and should lead to different policy 
recommendations than those elicited by the prevailing 
one-dimensional view on poverty.
Inequalities have multiple dimensions
Inequalities are not just about income. Income inequal-
ities, which are the easiest to measure, are tightly in-
tertwined with inequalities of power and related with 
issues such as ethnicity, caste, and – in each and every 
country – gender. Due to the structural nature of gender 
inequality and its intersection with other categories such 
as age, ethnicity, sexual orientation and income, women 
in most of societies continue to be overrepresented in 
18. Alex Cobham and Andy Sumner introduced this measure into the 
debate in 2013 based on the work of economist Gabriel Palma, cf. Cob-
ham/Sumner (2013) and Palma (2011).
the lowest quintiles of income distribution. They contin-
ue to be the most responsible for unpaid and care work 
and concentrated in the most precarious and poorly paid 
jobs. Women are still a minority in the spaces of rep-
resentation and leadership in politics, labor or territories; 
they still face gender-based violence, human traffick-
ing, and continue to have their sexual and reproductive 
rights and autonomy limited.19
As income disparities are assessed through house-
hold surveys that take the family as a unit (and basi-
cally assume equal distribution within the household) 
gender-based inequalities are frequently invisible to sta-
tistics in all countries, rich and poor. SDG Goal 5 rightly 
addresses these issues by demanding »equal rights to 
economic resources« for women (target 5.a) as well as 
»to recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work 
through the provision of public services, infrastructure 
and social protection policies» (target 5.4).
As early as 2007, the CSO network Social Watch pro-
posed a comprehensive indicator for measuring gender 
inequality, the Gender Equity Index (GEI). It entails in-
dicators from three dimensions: economic activity, em-
powerment, and education. The index’s values range 
from 0 to 100, with lower values indicating greater in-
equity and higher values greater equity. Since the meth-
odology for calculating the index is straight forward and 
covers many important dimensions of gender inequality 
while at the same time delivering an easy-to-understand 
result, it could serve as a blueprint not only for showing 
inequalities among genders, but also for other margin-
alized groups, be they defined by age, ethnicity or other 
characteristics.20
Policy implications
For rich countries, there are implications at two levels – 
at a minimum. Firstly, they need to tackle growing in-
equalities in their own societies, starting with: policies 
that provide greater equality of opportunities (e.g. free 
quality education for all); policies that tackle primary 
income distribution by promoting labor rights (e.g. the 
rights to bargain collectively and the right to strike), 
19. For more on what issues are key for gender justice today, cf. Social 
Watch (2014), pp. 21ff.
20. For more info on how the GEI works, cf. Social Watch (2007), pp. 85ff.
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strong labor market institutions and minimum wage 
policies that together can address the spectacular fall 
in the share of labor in the primary incomes in most 
of the rich countries; and policies targeting secondary 
distribution, such as progressive tax policies and social 
policies with redistributive impact, in particular social 
security. Target 10.4 calls for the adoption of policies, 
»especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies«, 
and »progressively achieve greater equality«, a chal-
lenge in all countries, including rich ones. This could 
also be used to achieve greater gender equality. Tax 
regimes, for example, are not gender neutral. Women 
and men experience the impact of tax policies as part 
of the workforce, as consumers, producers and as the 
»care economy« within and outside households. In this 
sense, regressive tax structures have disproportionate 
impacts on women.21
Secondly, developed countries must systematically as-
sess the distributional impact of their policies not only 
at home, but also abroad, in poor countries in particular. 
This impact assessment must also address the absence 
of proper policies and regulations. The case of the »race 
to the bottom« in tax collection is an obvious one, trade 
policy another. Macroeconomic policies, such as those 
generally called »austerity« (very similar to what used to 
be called ›structural adjustment‹ in developing countries) 
may also have negative implications for income distribu-
tion. They not only tend to increase inequality at home, 
but by depressing demand for imported goods and ser-
vices they negatively impact on producers elsewhere, in-
cluding small producers in countries of the Global South. 
Volatile and unregulated financial markets that produce 
asset bubbles and frequent financial crises, together 
with some of the policies pursued to deal with these 
crises (e.g. bank bail-outs, quantitative easing) are ma-
jor generators and multipliers of inequalities worldwide. 
It is with a view to addressing these dynamics that the 
SDG on inequalities includes target 10.5 that seeks to 
»improve regulation and monitoring of global financial 
markets and institutions.« 
21. Cf. DAWN (2014).
2.3 Sustainable Consumption and  
Production Patterns
Resource consumption
The High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Agenda wrote 
in its report 2013 that: »the MDGs fell short (…) by not 
addressing the need to promote sustainable patterns 
of consumption and production.«22 In a world of limit-
ed resources, dealing with unsustainable consumption 
and production is a prerequisite for sustainable devel-
opment. Therefore, it is indispensable that this issue is 
adequately addressed in the list of SDGs.
Already in 2011, Mohan Munasinghe, former Vice-Chair-
man of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) introduced the idea of Millennium Consumption 
Goals (MCG).23 He argued that the richest 20 per cent 
of the world’s population consume over 80 per cent of 
global output, or 60 times more than the poorest 20 per 
cent. Therefore, the main responsibility to prevent or re-
duce resource use, emissions and waste should fall on 
this richest 20 per cent.
They have a particular responsibility to drastically limit 
carbon emissions, energy consumption, primary re-
source extraction, waste generation, as well as air and 
water pollution, and replace non-renewable resources 
with renewable ones.
An important step on the way towards resource suffi-
ciency could be taken by increasing resource efficiency. 
Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, Karlson Hargroves and Mi-
chael Smith suggest to increase resource productivity 
by a factor of five, which – as they argue – is not just 
necessary in ecological terms, but also technically and 
economically feasible.24
Target 8.4. rightly asks to »improve progressively, 
through 2030, global resource efficiency in consump-
tion and production and endeavor to decouple eco-
nomic growth from environmental degradation (…) 
with developed countries taking the lead«. However, 
this formulation remains vague. It gives no indication 
22. Cf. UN High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda (2013), Executive Summary.
23. Cf. Munasinghe (2011).
24. Cf. Weizsäcker / Hargroves / Smith (2009) or Civil Society Reflection 
Group on Global Development Perspectives (2012), p. 42.
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of the level of ambition demanded from different types 
of countries, rich countries in particular. One must also 
bear in mind that higher resource efficiency does not au-
tomatically lead to an absolute decoupling of economic 
growth from environmental degradation, i.e. an effec-
tive reduction in natural resource use and environmental 
degradation. All too often exactly the opposite happens 
when cost savings due to higher efficiency lead to high-
er consumption levels that »eat up« efficiency gains. To 
counter this so-called »rebound effect« a drive for more 
efficiency must necessarily be accompanied by policies 
that increase the price for energy, water and minerals 
etc. in line with the increase in resource productivity, 
while at the same time ensuring everybody’s access to 
these goods and services, e.g. through free basic provi-
sioning or progressive pricing systems.25
25. Cf. Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspec-
tives (2012) p. 40.
Overall, it is important to accept that boundaries exist 
for the human consumption of finite resources. This is 
emphasized in the 2009 concept of Planetary Bounda-
ries (see box 2) which identifies nine boundaries (climate 
change, ocean acidification, accumulation of strato-
spheric ozone, global phosphorus and nitrogen cycles, 
freshwater use, land use change, biodiversity loss, at-
mospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) and 
quantifies the actual limits for all but the last two.26 Hu-
manity has already exceeded three of these Planetary 
Boundaries: the rate of biodiversity loss, climate change 
and nitrogen input to the biosphere. Other boundaries 
may be exceeded in the nearer future, in particular those 
for global freshwater use, change in land use, ocean 
acidification and interference with the global phospho-
rous cycle. If current trends continue we will have to face 
abrupt global environmental change, with detrimental 
consequences for people and the planet. To reverse 
26. Rockström et. al. (2009).
Box 2: Planetary Boundaries
The notion of »Planetary Boundaries« has not yet been accepted by the diplomatic community despite strong 
scientific base for it. The following table lists the nine planetary boundaries defined and partially quantified by 
scientists and the SDGs and targets that refer to them:
Climate change Goal 13
Ocean acidification Target 14.3
Stratospheric ozone depletion Not mentioned
Interference with the global phosphorus and  
nitrogen cycles
Not mentioned, but target 2.4 promotes »resilient 
agricultural practices (…) that help maintain ecosys-
tems«. This would imply an end to the fertilization 
practices that create this problem.
Rate of biodiversity loss Goal 15
Global freshwater use Goal 6
Land-system change Goal 15
Aerosol loading Not mentioned
Chemical Pollution Targets 3.9 and 6.3
While most of the Planetary Boundaries are recognized as problems by the SDGs and related targets, the latter 
lack specificity and basically reflect an aspiration for improvement. To overcome this weakness, the boundaries 
could be explicitly recognized and quantified globally; »budgets« could be established and allocated, according to 
the CBDR principle in ways that could take the climate convention as a model.
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this trend, people and production in rich countries have 
to reduce their Ecological Footprint substantially. This, 
again, could be based on the principle of CBDR, this time 
within countries.27
Not just a responsibility for consumers
That analysis could imply that all inhabitants of rich 
countries, as consumers, share similar responsibility. 
This is only partially true: mainly big corporations shape 
production and consumption patterns – and this across 
borders. According to a recent UNCTAD report on value 
chains: 
»Global investment and trade are inextricably inter-
twined through the international production networks 
of firms investing in productive assets worldwide and 
trading inputs and outputs in cross-border value chains 
of various degrees of complexity. Such value chains (…) 
shaped by TNCs account for some 80 per cent of global 
trade.«28
Therefore an SDG on consumption and production pat-
terns must not only address overconsumption and un-
sustainable lifestyles but also the production patterns of 
the business sector and corporations and the kinds of 
products they create. Corporations are to a large extent 
responsible for the exploitation of natural resources and 
the environmental damage that this can bring about. 
Value chains should integrate responsibility and liability 
chains, since corporations 
n are responsible for the design and marketing of prod-
ucts that are unsustainable; 
n are responsible for respecting – or violating – human 
rights within their sphere of influence along the supply 
chain; 
n are putting pressure on governments and the UN to 
avoid stricter regulation (see box 3).
27. The Ecological Footprint measures the size of land and water area 
a human population requires to produce the resources it consumes and 
to absorb its CO2 emissions, using the prevailing technology, cf. www.
footprintnetwork.org.
28. UNCTAD (2013a), p. iii. 
Box 3: Political will to take on big business
In 2013 Margaret Chan, the Director-General of 
the World Health Organization, delivered a re-
markable speech, in which she stated:
»Efforts to prevent noncommunicable diseases 
go against the business interests of powerful eco-
nomic operators. In my view, this is one of the big-
gest challenges facing health promotion.
(…) it is not just Big Tobacco anymore. Public 
health must also contend with Big Food, Big Soda, 
and Big Alcohol. All of these industries fear regu-
lation, and protect themselves by using the same 
tactics. 
Research has documented these tactics well. They 
include front groups, lobbies, promises of self-reg-
ulation, lawsuits, and industry-funded research 
that confuses the evidence and keeps the public 
in doubt. 
Tactics also include gifts, grants, and contributions 
to worthy causes that cast these industries as re-
spectable corporate citizens in the eyes of politi-
cians and the public. They include arguments that 
place the responsibility for harm to health on indi-
viduals, and portray government actions as inter-
ference in personal liberties and free choice.
This is formidable opposition. Market power readi-
ly translates into political power. Few governments 
prioritize health over big business. (…) This is not a 
failure of individual will-power. This is a failure of 
political will to take on big business.«29
Governments cannot leave the responsibility to change 
consumption and production patterns solely in the 
hands of individual consumers and producers. Govern-
ments have to play a lead role in establishing limits and 
standards and setting the right policy incentives, or, first 
of all, correcting wrong incentives. 
29. Cf. Chan (2013).
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Privileges for corporations created over the last two dec-
ades under trade and investment rules should be re-bal-
anced with corresponding rights and privileges of societies 
and people – with the standard being set by the latter! 
Mandatory reporting on environmental, social and 
human rights impacts by transnational and large na-
tional corporations is a sine qua non for democratic ac-
countability. Voluntary agreements and initiatives have 
attempted to fill this gap and have helped to create a 
climate of reporting, but do not provide the legal guar-
antees, scrutiny and where necessary, sanctions, needed 
for effective governance.
This is why a legally binding international instrument on 
the obligations of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises is necessary. It should include all ILO 
standards and multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), be based on the UN Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights and provide for remedies for vic-
tims, both nationally and internationally, with the aim of 
improving weak voluntary provisions of national actions 
plans under the UN Guiding Principles and making them 
binding. 
These actions should be part of a complete overhaul of 
the current investment regime. As a minimum, the cur-
rent system of investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) 
should be abolished. Its current set-up protects a system, 
which grants foreign companies the unilateral privilege 
to sue governments before secret private arbitration tri-
bunals for huge amounts of compensation, when gov-
ernment legislation in the public interest (e.g. to foster 
sustainable production) is seemingly affecting their 
profits. It could be replaced by a standing international 
investment court30 – or even better – an international 
human rights court (or a system of regional investment 
or human right courts) dealing with investment-related 
disputes where access would be granted not only to in-
vestors, but equally to communities and workers whose 
rights had been trampled on. Without this overhaul, 
there is the real danger that the controversial and con-
tested ISDS-system becomes further entrenched interna-
tionally by two »mega-regional« trade and investment 
agreements currently being negotiated, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
30. Cf. UNCTAD (2013b), p. 9.
ment Partnership (TTIP)31. Both aim at (indirectly) setting 
global standards and contain ISDS. Finally, governments 
should introduce effective international regulation for 
transnational corporations to prevent corporate actors 
from unduly influencing global policy making.32 To do 
so, they should adopt, inter alia, clear mandatory guide-
lines and policies for their relationship with corporations 
as well as establishing comprehensive transparency and 
conflict of interest policies.
2.4 Financial and Structural  
Means of Implementation
The implementation of the SDGs with their targets and 
indicators will require changes in fiscal policy as well as 
adjustments in terms of governance and regulation. Fiscal 
policy – government income and spending – is a premier 
instrument of governments to turn the SDGs into practice. 
The actual priorities of governments are reflected more 
clearly in public budgets than in government declarations. 
However, none of the goals and targets will automatically 
have an impact on national budgets. Some or many might 
be achieved by means of regulatory polices – such as im-
proved labor standards or regulations of chemicals use – or 
new mechanisms, like better cooperation among govern-
ments and reform of global governance institutions.
Filling financial gaps
In recent decades, we have witnessed the erosion of pub-
lic finance in many countries, which has resulted in the 
growing inability of governments to provide the necessary 
public goods and services in support of people’s welfare 
and care systems, thus failing to respond effectively to 
aggravated social and environmental problems. There is 
an urgent need to strengthen and redirect public finance. 
Fiscal policy can serve basically four purposes: the rais-
ing of revenues in order to provide the necessary pub-
lic goods and services; the redistribution of income and 
wealth from the richer to the poorer sections of society; 
the re-pricing of goods and services in order to inter-
nalize ecological and social costs and discourage un-
desirable behavior (such as currency speculation); and 
31. Cf. Eberhardt (2014).
32. Cf. Pingeot (2014).
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the justification for citizens to demand democratic rep-
resentation (›no taxation without representation‹) and 
accountability. 
A pro-active tax policy includes, for example, the taxa-
tion of the extraction and consumption of non-renewa-
ble resources, and forms of progressive taxation that are 
sensitive to the well being of poor people (e.g. by taxing 
consumption of luxuries). On the expenditure side, gov-
ernments should take measures to initiate the redistri-
bution of income and wealth, and to trigger ecological 
steering effects. This can include cash transfers to poor 
families, child benefits, and the phasing out of ineffec-
tive or even harmful subsidies. 
If priorities are properly defined, budget policies can be-
come a powerful instrument to reduce social inequality, 
eliminate discrimination, and promote the transition to 
sustainable patterns of production and consumption. 
Realizing any set of SDGs will only be possible if gov-
ernments undertake the necessary adjustments in their 
tax and budget policies. In other words, they have to 
formulate Sustainable Development Budgets in order to 
implement SDGs. This requires eco-social fiscal reforms 
at the national level. But it also requires strengthened 
tax cooperation at the global level.
In the last few years, international cooperation in tax 
matters has intensified. But this takes place mainly with-
in the OECD and the G20. Countries who are not mem-
bers of these clubs are either excluded or only invited 
for consultations. A universal intergovernmental body 
on tax cooperation under the roof of the UN is needed.
So far, the UN’s work has centered on the UN Committee 
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. 
This is far from being sufficient. In order to strengthen 
international tax cooperation and to combat tax evasion 
and harmful tax avoidance, the expert committee at the 
very least should be promoted to an Intergovernmental 
Commission on Tax Cooperation – or even better an In-
ternational Tax Organization.33
33. The Zedillo Panel proposed already in 2001 that the international 
community should consider the potential benefits of an International Tax 
Organization, cf. High-level Panel on Financing for Development (2001), 
p.9. Placing the matter of tax policies under the auspices of the United 
Nations could also serve to ensure that the effects of tax rules have on 
the fulfillment of Human Rights are being emphasized. Cf. UN Human 
Rights Council (2015).
Yet, even with a strengthened system of public finance, 
in many countries the maximum available resources will 
not suffice to implement the Post-2015 Agenda. External 
funding will still be required. This means that the »old« 
instrument of »Official Development Assistance« (ODA) 
will still be needed – and complemented by new financial 
instruments to help mitigate and compensate, for exam-
ple, for the results of climate change and finance MEAs.
A necessary but not sufficient »goal for the rich« is final-
ly to implement obligations entered into in the past. This 
is especially true for the 45-year old promise to spend 
0.7 per cent of GDP on ODA. Additionally, industrialized 
countries pledged to make available another 100 billion 
per year in climate finance. These promises are repeated 
by the SDGs. It’s overdue that countries come up with 
concrete plans and timetables on how they will be real-
izing them. This could be one indicator to measure the 
fulfillment of goal 17.2.
One way for rich countries to meet their obligations 
would be the introduction of »innovative« means of 
finance, like the long debated financial transaction tax 
(FTT). Eleven European countries will levy one model 
of such a tax from 2016 on. Estimates on how much 
will be raised range from 2.5 to 18 billion Euros per year 
for a country like Germany. Whether this additional in-
come will be spent on ODA or address environmental 
challenges, however, is uncertain yet. Therefore, these 
governments should take the opportunity of the Financ-
ing for Development (FfD) and Post-2015 Summits to 
demonstrate their determination to spend the FTT reve-
nues to achieve the SDGs.
Another means for improving the financial situation of 
countries in the South would be to stop the outflow of 
funds from these countries. Currently, more money is 
leaving the South than vice-versa.34 Structural issues to 
be tackled in this regard include a reversal of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) regimes; the abolition of prefer-
ential tax regimes in countries of the North for incomes 
generated from IPRs and services in the South;35 the re-
formulation of double tax treaties that are harmful to 
the interests of southern countries;36 and, maybe most 
34. Cf. UNDESA et al. (2015), pp. 64f.
35. An issue debated during the 10th session of the UN Committee 
of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, cf. UN Doc. 
E/2014/45-E/C.18/2014/6, pp. 18ff.
36. Cf. Eurodad (2014), pp. 18f.
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importantly, a reform or replacement of international 
transfer pricing rules that have become so complicated 
and impossible to administer that they facilitate abuse, 
adding up to several hundred billions in illicit financial 
flows from developing countries alone, annually.37
To determine whether the policies of rich countries are 
»sustainable« and meet their obligations, it will of course 
not be enough to look at ODA quotas as an indicator. 
For many years now, indices on policy coherence for 
development or sustainability are being discussed. The 
Commitment to Development Index of the Center for 
Global Development is one example that could be built 
upon. The Open Knowledge Foundation in Germany 
and Spanish Plataforma 2015 y más are working on sim-
ilar approaches, though with different political impetus. 
What they have in common is that they look at various 
sectors (environment, finance, trade, security, technol-
ogy transfer, migration, development cooperation etc.) 
and check them for their coherence towards sustaina-
bility. These approaches could guide further debates to-
wards meaningful goals and indicators for the rich.
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships
The Open Working Group proposes as a measure to 
strengthen the means of implementation to enhance the 
global partnership for sustainable development, »com-
plemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mo-
bilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and 
financial resources (…)« (SDG 17.16) and to »(e)ncourage 
and promote effective public, public-private and civil so-
ciety partnerships, building on the experience and re-
sourcing strategies of partnerships.« (SDG 17.17)
These proposals build on the notion that governments 
will not be able to solve global problems alone. Partner-
ships primarily with the private sector are seen as the 
main driver of development. However, the assessments 
of the advantages of global partnerships are for the 
most part not based on empirical research and a thor-
ough power and interest analysis of the actors involved. 
The widely held notion that there is no alternative is of-
ten no more than a profession of faith.
37. Washington based think tank Global Financial Integrity estimates that 
illicit financial flows from developing countries amount to 991.2 billion 
US-Dollar for 2012 alone; 77.8 per cent of this amount can be attributed 
to trade misinvoicing. Cf. Kar / Spanjers (2014).
Public-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder part-
nerships bring a number of risks and side effects with 
them that must be considered carefully in the further 
discussions on the Post-2015 Agenda. In particular, the 
following questions should be addressed:
n Growing influence of the business sector in the 
political discourse and agenda-setting: Do partner-
ship initiatives allow transnational corporations and their 
interest groups growing influence over agenda setting 
and political decision-making by governments?
n fragmentation of global governance: How can 
governments avoid that partnerships lead to isolated 
solutions, which are poorly coordinated, often contrib-
ute to the institutional weakening of the United Nations 
and its specialized agencies, and hinder comprehensive 
development strategies? 
n Weakening of representative democracy: Inas-
much as partnerships give all participating actors equal 
rights, do they sideline the special political and legal 
position occupied legitimately by public bodies (govern-
ments and parliaments)?
n unstable financing – a threat to the sufficient 
provision of public goods: Will the funding of the 
Post-2015 Agenda become increasingly privatized and 
dependent on voluntary and ultimately unpredictable 
channels of financing through corporations, benevolent 
individuals or private philanthropic foundations? Are the 
financial resources committed in the existing partnership 
initiatives actually new and additional? Have they effec-
tively increased the available resources?
n lack of monitoring and accountability mecha-
nisms: What instruments are in place to guarantee that 
partnerships as well as the proposed Partnership Facility 
act in an open and transparent manner and can be held 
accountable for their actions?
Nevertheless, the Secretary General proposes in his 
Synthesis Report »principled and responsible public- 
private-people partnerships« as »a key feature of im-
plementation at all levels: global, regional, national and 
local«.38 In that, he adds, »mutual accountability is crit-
ical.«
38. Cf. UN Secretary-General (2014), para. 81.
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Mutual accountability is a concept enshrined in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and it refers to a rela-
tion between donor and »partner« governments. In a 
more complex partnership, involving corporations and 
civil society it is unclear how »mutual« is to be under-
stood since governments should be accountable to their 
citizens but certainly not to corporations.
The role of private actors is also virulent in the debates 
and proposals around FfD, an agenda that could well 
determine whether the SDGs are likely to be implement-
ed after all. There, debates circle around the question of 
how to tap into the seemingly bottomless pit of private 
financial assets and steer them in the direction of achiev-
ing sustainable development. Ideas proposed range 
from creating conducive regulatory and political envi-
ronments to attract investment to »leveraging« private 
money with public funds. These approaches, however, 
have to be considered very carefully.39
In an open letter to the UN Secretary-General of Novem-
ber 2014, the »Righting Finance« coalition of civil soci-
ety networks proposes the following ex-ante criteria to 
be applied before engaging the UN in any such alliance 
with corporations:40 
n »whether the private actor has a history or current sta-
tus of serious allegations of abusing human rights or the 
environment, including in their cross-border activities;
n whether the private actor has a proven track record 
(or the potential to) deliver on sustainable development, 
as articulated by the UN outcome by 2015, including rul-
ing out conflicts of interest; 
n whether the private actor has previous involvement in 
acts of corruption with government officials; and 
n whether the private actor is fully transparent in its 
financial reporting and fully respecting existing tax re-
sponsibilities in all countries within which it operates.«
Righting Finance considers further that »private sector 
financing and public-private partnerships for sustain-
able development should likewise be accompanied by 
39. For more on the issue of private actors in Financing for Development, 
cf. Adams / Luchsinger (2015).
40. Cf. Righting Finance (2014), p. 12.
mandatory transparency and accountability safeguards 
in compliance with human rights norms and standards 
putting people’s rights before profit.«41
These are minimal safeguards to prevent the UN from 
potential reputational shocks if chief private financiers it 
engages with were found to be also chief violators of its 
most cherished principles.
3. Conclusion
The above-mentioned discussion has focused on a few 
examples of what obligations for the rich could and 
should entail in a truly universal SDG or Post-2015 Agen-
da. Issues like migration, arms trade, indigenous people’s 
rights, trade, investment and intellectual property rights 
policies and many more could and should complement 
the list. Also, we have not explored here the issue of 
how to hold actors accountable in the implementation 
of the Post-2015 Agenda.42
Fulfilling the SDGs – albeit with some deficiencies we 
have highlighted in this paper – will require some serious 
reshuffling of the cards. In order to create environmental 
and policy space for the poor to enjoy their human rights 
and achieve a decent level of prosperity, the rich – mean-
ing rich countries as well as rich individuals everywhere – 
will have to profoundly change their consumption and 
production patterns, as well as the patterns whereby 
profit from value chains is not only reaped at the very 
end of the chains.
This reshuffling requires fundamental shifts in the power 
relations between social groups and groupings at na-
tional and international levels. And it requires a funda-
mental change of mindset, by, inter alia, restoring public 
rights over corporate privileges.43
41. Ibid.
42. For more on this issue, cf. Civil Society Reflection Group on Global 
Development Perspectives (2013), p. 6 and Bissio (2015).
43. Cf. Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspec-
tives (2011).
15
Civil SoCiety RefleCtion GRoup on Global Development peRSpeCtiveS  |  GoalS foR the RiCh
literature
adams, barbara / luchsinger, Gretchen (2015): Post-2015 and FfD3: Debates Begin, Political Lines Emerge. Global 
Policy Watch Briefing #1. New York. https://www.globalpolicywatch.org/post-2015-and-ffd3-debates-begin-political-
lines-emerge/
bissio, Roberto (2015): The “A” Word: Monitoring the SDGs. Briefing 26, February 2015. New York: Future United 
Nations Development System. www.futureun.org/media/archive1/briefings/FUNDS_Brief26_Feb2015_Bissio.pdf
Chan, margaret (2013): WHO Director-General addresses health promotion conference. Helsinki. www.who.int/dg/
speeches/2013/health_promotion_20130610/en/
Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development perspectives (2013): Towards a Framework of Universal 
Sustainability Goals as Part of a Post-2015 Agenda. Discussion Paper. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.
de/pdf-files/iez/10075.pdf
Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development perspectives (2012): No future without justice. Report 
of the Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives. Development Dialogue No. 59, June 2012. 
Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. www.reflectiongroup.org/stuff/no-future-without-justice
Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development perspectives (2011): Urgent Appeal to Change the Mind-
set. New York. www.reflectiongroup.org/stuff/mindset-appeal
Cobham, alex / Sumner, andy (2013): Is It All About the Tails? The Palma Measure of Income Inequality. Working 
Paper 343, September 2013. Washington D.C./London: Center for Global Development. www.cgdev.org/sites/default/
files/it-all-about-tails-palma-measure-income-inequality.pdf
Dauderstädt, michael / Keltek, Cem (2014): Crisis, Austerity and Cohesion – Europe’s Stagnating Inequality. Perspec-
tive, April 2014. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/10672.pdf
DaWn (2014): Statement prepared by a group of participants of the Financial Transparency Coalition and Latindadd 
Conference “Hidden Money, Hidden Resources: Financing Development with Transparency” Lima, 14-15 October 2014. 
http://www.dawnnet.org/feminist-resources/content/statement-prepared-group-participants-financial-transparency-co-
alition-and-latindadd?tid=1
eberhardt, pia (2014): Investment Protection at the Crossroads – The TTIP and the Future of International Investment Law. 
International Policy Analysis. July 2014. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/10875.pdf 
eurodad (eds.) (2014): Hidden profits: The EU’s role in supporting an unjust global tax system 2014. Brussels. http://
eurodad.org/files/pdf/54819867f1726.pdf
Kar, Dev / Spanjers, Joseph (2014): Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003-2012. Washington D.C.: 
Global Financial Integrity. www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Illicit-Financial-Flows-from-Develop-
ing-Countries-2003-2012.pdf
Krämer, Hagen (2014): Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft – Plädoyer für die Einführung einer 
Platon-Steuer. WISO direkt, März 2014. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/10579.pdf
milanovic, branko (2009): Global Inequality Recalculated – The Effect of New 2005 PPP Estimates on Global Inequality. 
Policy Research Working Paper 5061. Washington D.C. http://go.worldbank.org/MHYON5KKI0
munasinghe, mohan (2011): Millennium consumption goals (MCG): how the rich can make the planet more sustaina-
ble. In: The Island, February 1st 2011. www.mohanmunasinghe.com/pdf/Island-MCG-1Feb20112.pdf
oxfam (2015): Wealth: Having it all and wanting more. Oxfam Issue Briefing, January 2015. Oxford. www.oxfam.org/
sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/ib-wealth-having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf
oxfam (2013): The cost of inequality: how wealth and income extremes hurt us all. Oxford. www.oxfam.org/sites/www.
oxfam.org/files/cost-of-inequality-oxfam-mb180113.pdf
palma, José Gabriel (2011): Homogeneous middles vs. heterogeneous tails, and the end of the ‘Inverted-U’: The share 
of the rich is what it’s all about. Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1111. Cambridge. www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/
repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1111.pdf
pingeot, lou (2014): Corporate influence in the Post-2015 process. Aachen/Berlin/Bonn/New York: MISEREOR/Brot für 
die Welt/Global Policy Forum. https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Corporate_influence_in_the_Post-
2015_process_web.pdf
Righting finance (2014): A human rights assessment of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable 
Development Financing Report. www.rightingfinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/full-response.pdf
Rockström, Johan. et al. (2009): Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity. In: Ecology 
and Society 14(2). www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art32/
Social Watch (2014): Gender Roundtable – What are the key gender justice issues today? In: Social Watch: Means and 
Ends. Social Watch Report 2014, pp. 21-23. Montevideo. www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/gender2014_eng.pdf
Social Watch (2007): In dignity and rights – Making the universal right to social security a reality. Montevideo. http://
socialwatch.org/node/9292
un High-level panel of eminent persons on the post-2015 Development agenda (2013): A New Global Part-
nership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Develop- ment. The Report of the High-Lev-
el Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.  New York. www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/
HLP_P2015_Report.pdf
un High-level panel on financing for Development (2001): Recommendations of the High-level Panel on Financing 
for Development. New York. (UN Doc. A/55/1000) www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/1000
un Human Rights Council (2015): Illicit financial flows, human rights and post-2015 development agenda. Interim 
16
Civil SoCiety RefleCtion GRoup on Global Development peRSpeCtiveS  |  GoalS foR the RiCh
study by the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of 
States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky. 
Geneva. (UN Doc. A/HRC/28/60). www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/IEDebt/A_HRC_28_60_en.pdf
un open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014): Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable 
Development Goals. New York. http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1579SDGs%20Proposal.pdf
un Secretary-General (2014): The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, trans- forming all lives and protecting the 
planet. Synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. New York. (UN 
Doc. A/69/700, 4 December 2014). www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E
unCtaD (2013a): Global Value Chains and Development – Investment and value added trade in the global economy. A 
preliminary analysis. Geneva. http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/diae2013d1_en.pdf
unCtaD (2013b) IIA Issues Note: Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search for a Roadmap;  http://unctad.
org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf
unDeSa (2013): Inequality Matters – Report on the World Social Situation 2013. New York. www.un.org/esa/socdev/
documents/reports/InequalityMatters.pdf
unDeSa / unCtaD / eCa / eCe / eClaC / eSCap / eSCWa (2015): World Economic Situation and Prospects 2015. New 
York. www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/
Weizsäcker, ernst ulrich / Hargroves, Karlson / Smith, michael (2009): Factor Five. Transforming the Global Econo-
my through 80% Improvements in Resource Productivity. London.
Wilkinson, Richard / pickett, Kate (2009): The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger, New York.
imprint
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Global Policy and Development
Hiroshimastr. 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Geneva Office
6bis | Chemin du Point-du-Jour |1202 Geneva | Switzerland
Responsible:
Hubert René Schillinger | Director, FES Geneva
Phone: +41-22-733-3450 | Fax: +41-22-733-3545
www.fes-globalization.org/geneva
To order publications:
Sandra.Richter@fes.de
Commercial use of media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of 
the FES.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily 
those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for 
which the author works.
This publication is printed on paper from sustainable forestry.
iSbn
978-3-95861-114-6
This discussion paper has been prepared for the Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives. It is part of a 
series of papers addressing key issues related the Post-2015 Agenda.
The Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development Perspectives was established in November 2010 by Social Watch, Third 
World Network, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Global Policy Forum, 
terre des hommes and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. It provides an informal space for in-depth discussions for civil society 
activists and scholars from all parts of the world to explore conventional and alternative models of development and well-being.
The following members of the Reflection Group contributed to this paper: Barbara Adams (Global Policy Forum), Chee Yoke Ling 
(Third World Network), Danuta Sacher (terre des hommes), Gita Sen (DAWN), Nicole Bidegain (DAWN), Ziad Abdel Samad (Arab 
NGO Network for Development), Henning Melber (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation), Hubert Schillinger (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), 
Roberto Bissio (Social Watch), Jens Martens (Global Policy Forum), Wolfgang Obenland (Global Policy Forum).
